A vast literature documents negative skewness and excess kurtosis in stock return distributions on several markets. We approach the issue of negative skewness from a different angle than in previous studies by suggesting a model, which we denote the "negative news threshold" hypothesis, that builds on asymmetrically distributed information and symmetric market responses. Our empirical tests reveal that returns for days when non-scheduled news are disclosed are the source of negative skewness in stock returns. This finding lends solid support to our model and suggests that negative skewness in stock returns is induced by asymmetries in the news disclosure policies of firm management.
Introduction
Normal distribution of stock returns is one of the most pronounced assumptions underlying central theory and the empirical tools used in financial economics.
However, a vast literature 1 documents negative skewness and excess kurtosis in stock return distributions for several markets. Ignoring asymmetries in return distributions, e.g. negative skewness, can lead to major underestimation of risk and thereby to biased pricing of financial instruments such as stocks and standardized option contracts. Furthermore, conditional negative skewness might induce systematical errors in empirical tests based on time-invariant return distributions, such as event studies.
The financial economics literature offers several explanations for negative asymmetries in stock returns. The first and perhaps most well known explanation is that of the leverage effect (Black, 1976 and Christie, 1982) . According to the leverage effect hypothesis, a drop in the market value of the firm increases the operating and financial leverage and thus also increases the volatility of the subsequent returns.
However, for instance Schwert (1989) , and Bekaert and Wu (2000) find that the leverage effect is not of the magnitude to explain the observed asymmetry. In particular this seems to be the case for daily or more frequent return data. Another explanation, denoted 'volatility feedback hypothesis', is developed by Pindyck 1 Non-normality of stock returns is first documented in the seminal articles by Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) . Further, e.g. Press (1967) , Praetz (1972) , Smith (1981) , Kon (1984) , Gray and French (1990) , Peiró (1994) and Aparicio and Estrada (2001) explore stock return distributions and find that the normality assumption is in general rejected. Negative skewness and the related phenomenon of asymmetric volatility is investigated in e.g. Pindyck (1984) , French et al.(1987) , Campbell and Hentschel (1992) , Engle and Ng (1993) , Glosten et al.(1993) , Braun et al.(1995) , Duffee (1995) , Bekaert and Wu (2000) .
(1984), French et al. (1987) , and Campbell and Hentschell (1992) . This hypothesis states that news increases the volatility of a stock and hence also its risk premium, which in turn magnifies negative returns and reduces positive returns. On the aggregate this hypothesis results in negatively skewed returns. Poterba and Summers (1986) , amongst others, question the plausibility of this hypothesis as volatility shocks in the market generally last for a short time period and hence cannot be expected to change risk premiums. Negative skewness can also be explained by "stochastic bubbles" models, originating from the work by Blanchard and Watson (1982) . In this context, negative skewness is generated by the popping of stochastic bubbles, which creates large negative returns in the market.
In the more recent model, put forward by Hong and Stein (1999) , short sales constraints prohibit all available information to be disseminated to the market and thus create temporary valuation disequilibria. These temporary disequilibria are corrected by large negative returns following arrival of new information. Chen et al (2001) find some, however indirect, support for this model. An apparent weakness in the Hong and Stein (1999) model is the underlying assumption of heterogeneous investors, of which some show behavior different from full Bayesian rationality.
The lack of statistical power and economic intuition of the above presented hypotheses leads us to the conclusion that we have not yet reached a full understanding of the mechanisms underlying negative skewness in stock returns. We approach the problem of negative skewness from an altogether different angle than in previous studies. Instead of assuming normally distributed information and asymmetric market response, we suggest a model with asymmetrically distributed information and symmetric market response. Our model of asymmetrically distributed information is derived from earlier research in management disclosure practices. We test the predictions of our model using five years of daily return data for the 15 most traded shares on the Helsinki Stock Exchange and document solid support for the model. We find that, in line with the predictions of the model, negative skewness in stock returns is induced by non-scheduled firm specific news disclosures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its implications for stock return distributions. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to the market structure of the Helsinki Stock Exchange and describes the data employed in the study. Section 4 presents the main findings and finally, section 5 concludes the study.
Hypothesis Development
Our model builds on the fact that the management of a firm has two options when it receives new information regarding the firm: to disclose or to not disclose the news.
The result of this consideration is a function of the expected utility for the two alternatives. The expected utility of disclosing news can be expected to be a fairly linear function of the magnitude of the news 2 . The expected utility of disclosing news hence strongly correlates with the changes in value of the firm that follow the disclosure of the news. The second alternative, to not disclose the news, is represented by the expected disutility due to possible litigation and reputation costs that can occur if the management withholds information from the shareholders 3 . We propose that the utility function of not disclosing news has a negative second derivative 4 and thus rapidly decreases in value with the magnitude of the not disclosed news. This springs from the intuition that small news can be withhold by the managements with small, if any, possibility of litigation, but the withholding of large news leads with high certainty to legal consequences.
A rational manager will always select the alternative, disclosing or not disclosing news, which yields higher utility. Figure 1 displays the utility functions of the two alternatives. In graphical terms, the manager will thus switch between the two utility functions in order to create a combination that dominates both functions. This behavior results in disclosing all but moderately negative news, which in turn creates what we denote the "negative news threshold".
2 Ross (1978) and Milgrom (1981) show that good (bad) news always increases (decreases) firm value. Further, Milgrom (1981) finds that a value-maximizing manager has an incentive to voluntary disclose all positive information and withhold negative information. The managers will disclose all available information only under highly stylized conditions. 3 See e.g. Dye (1986) , Skinner (1994) and Trueman (1997) for discussion on disclosure policies and related costs. 4 For instance, the general function f(X)=aX 2 where a<0 satisfies this condition.
Figure 1 Utility functions for disclosing and not disclosing non-scheduled news
The above presented "negative news threshold" hypothesis implies that returns following non-scheduled news 5 exhibit negative skewness, since the management withholds the news items that fall within the "negative news threshold". This is true since the omitted moderately negative observations will alter the mean of the distribution to the right and the distribution will become asymmetric around the mean 6 . The created distribution has excessively large probability mass for large negative observations, or is in other words negatively skewed. 5 We recognize that the management cannot choose to withhold news items that are scheduled in advance, e.g. interim and annual reports. Hence, the "negative news threshold" hypothesis holds only for news items that are not scheduled to be released. 6 Naturally some of these omitted moderately negative news will eventually be disclosed as they are magnified enough to exceed the negative news threshold. Further, another fraction of the moderately negative news will be neutralized due to actions undertaken by the management in order to correct the problem.
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We test the "negative news threshold" hypothesis by investigating whether the abovepresented projections hold true in the data. The expected skewness for different samples of returns is schematically described in Figure 2 . listed on the HEX are compelled to submit their news items through the HEX, the gathered news items represent a rather complete coverage of firm specific news. We calculate 1-day logarithmic and abnormal logarithmic returns 8 for each share for the above defined time period (1.5.1996 to 30.4.2001) .
Further, we divide the return sample into news and no-news return samples. We define news returns as close-to-close returns beginning from the closing price for the day before the announcement day and ending at the close of the announcement day.
No-news returns we define as close-to-close returns for days without firm specific announcements 9 . We also define two subsets of news, scheduled and non-scheduled.
The scheduled news sample includes the disclosure of annual and interim reports, which occur at dates publicly announced in advance. The remaining news items form the non-scheduled news sample. Abnormal logarithmic returns are finally calculated by subtracting expected returns for each stock and day from the corresponding observed returns and transforming these returns to logarithmic returns. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the 1-day logarithmic returns for the HEX Portfolio Index. The average annual return for the investigated time period is 18.86%, which can be considered to be somewhat above the long-term expected return.
Abnormal Logarithmic Returns

The Helsinki Stock Exchange
However, the data includes both periods of strong growth and decline, hence providing samples of returns under different market conditions. 
Results
Tests for skewness are performed for the different samples specified earlier. Below we report results for the different samples in the order specified in Figure 2 in the "Hypothesis Development" section. (0, 6/N) and N(0, 24/N), respectively. J-B denotes the JarqueBera test statistic for normality, which is calculated as N [ skewness 2 / 6 + kurtosis 2 / 24 ] and is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with two degrees of freedom. p(S) denotes the probability value of the estimated statistic S. The "All" row displays averages for the statistics calculated for the individual stocks. The probabilities for the "All" row are calculated on the average statistics. The mean return on the "All" row is an observation weighted average of the mean returns of the individual stocks. Abnormal logarithmic returns are calculated using 365 calendar day market models, which are reestimated on a daily basis. Table 2 shows that both logarithmic and abnormal logarithmic returns in the full sample show significant negative skewness. As earlier mentioned, this characteristic is documented by a vast literature and is the starting point of our research. Table 3 displays sample moments for 1-day logarithmic and abnormal logarithmic returns for days during which firm specific news is disclosed, for the 15 most traded shares on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the time period 1.5.1996-30.4.2001 . The 15 most traded shares are evaluated on an annual basis by the daily EUR volume, resulting in altogether 28 stocks belonging to this group during the overall time period. Skewness (Skw) and excess kurtosis (Krt) are asymptotically distributed N(0, 6/N) and N(0, 24/N), respectively. J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality, which is calculated as N [ skewness 2 / 6 + kurtosis 2 / 24 ] and is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with two degrees of freedom. p(S) denotes the probability value of the estimated statistic S. The "All" row displays averages for the statistics calculated for the individual stocks. The probabilities for the "All" row are calculated on the average statistics. The mean return on the "All" row is an observation weighted average of the mean returns of the individual stocks. Abnormal logarithmic returns are calculated using 365 calendar day market models, which are re-estimated on a daily basis. As displayed by Table 3 , both logarithmic and abnormal logarithmic returns in the news sample show significant negative skewness. This finding supports our "negative news threshold" hypothesis, as negative skewness is expected. Table 4 displays sample moments for 1-day logarithmic and abnormal logarithmic returns for days during which firm specific news is not disclosed, for the 15 most traded shares on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the time period 1.5.1996-30.4.2001 . The 15 most traded shares are evaluated on an annual basis by the daily EUR volume, resulting in altogether 28 stocks belonging to this group during the overall time period. Skewness (Skw) and excess kurtosis (Krt) are asymptotically distributed N(0, 6/N) and N(0, 24/N), respectively. J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality, which is calculated as N [ skewness 2 / 6 + kurtosis 2 / 24 ] and is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with two degrees of freedom. p(S) denotes the probability value of the estimated statistic S. The "All" row displays averages for the statistics calculated for the individual stocks. The probabilities for the "All" row are calculated on the average statistics. The mean return on the "All" row is an observation weighted average of the mean returns of the individual stocks. Abnormal logarithmic returns are calculated using 365 calendar day market models, which are re-estimated on a daily basis. As expected, Table 4 shows that negative skewness cannot be found in the no-news sample. In fact, the abnormal logarithmic returns even display positive skewness. We hence document evidence that supports our hypothesis, and conclude that the negative skewness in the full sample is induced by the news sample. Table 5 displays sample moments for 1-day abnormal logarithmic returns for days during which firm specific scheduled and non-scheduled news is disclosed, for the 15 most traded shares on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the time period 1.5.1996-30.4.2001 . The scheduled news sample includes the disclosure of annual and interim reports, which occur at dates publicly announced in advance. The remaining news items form the non-scheduled news sample. The 15 most traded shares are evaluated on an annual basis by the daily EUR volume, resulting in altogether 28 stocks belonging to this group during the overall time period. Skewness (Skw) and excess kurtosis (Krt) are asymptotically distributed N(0, 6/N) and N(0, 24/N), respectively. J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality, which is calculated as N [ skewness 2 / 6 + kurtosis 2 / 24 ] and is asymptotically distributed as chi-square with two degrees of freedom. p(S) denotes the probability value of the estimated statistic S. Abnormal logarithmic returns are calculated using 365 calendar day market models, which are re-estimated on a daily basis. Table 5 confirms that negative skewness in the news sample is induced by the nonscheduled news sample. This is apparent, since the scheduled news sample shows significantly positive skewness while the non-scheduled news is significantly negatively skewed.
In summary, we find that negative skewness in daily returns is induced by returns for days when firm specific news is disclosed. Further, a closer investigation reveals that the negative skewness for the news sample is generated by negative skewness for non-scheduled news. Our results hence lend solid support to the "negative news threshold" hypothesis.
Summary and Conclusions
However, a vast literature documents negative skewness and excess kurtosis in stock return distributions for several markets. In this paper, we approach the problem of negative skewness from an altogether different angle than in previous studies. Instead of assuming normally distributed information and asymmetric market response, we suggest a model with asymmetrically distributed information and symmetric market response. Our model of asymmetrically distributed information, which we denote the "negative news threshold" hypothesis, is derived from earlier research in management disclosure practices and states that negative skewness in stock returns is generated by management disclosure practices. More specifically, the "negative news threshold" hypothesis implies that negative skewness in stock returns is mainly induced by returns for days when non-scheduled firm specific news items are disclosed.
We test the predictions of our model using five years of daily return data for the 15 most traded shares on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. We find that negative skewness in daily returns is induced by returns for days when firm specific news is disclosed.
Further, a closer investigation reveals that the negative skewness for the news sample is generated by negative skewness for non-scheduled news. Our results hence lend solid support to the "negative news threshold" hypothesis, which states that firm management discloses information asymmetrically.
